Dartblog

The aphorism about media attention is variously stated as ‘bad press is better than no press’ and ‘there is no such thing as bad press…’ but I don’t believe the same principle can be said to hold for political endorsements.

A interesting post on Power Line about the endorsement of Barack Obama in the Democratic primary and (potentially) the general election…by Hamas. Specifically the endorsement was made by the chief political adviser to Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister in Gaza. Perhaps cute little “Terrorists for Obama” will start popping up.

Obama has already been endorsed by notoriously racist and antisemitic and Louis Farrakhan, although to be fair he rejected and denounced this endorsement. Meanwhile his pastor said that Farrakhan “epitomizes greatness,” Wright a man who said “No, no, no, not G-d Bless America. G-d damn America — that’s in the Bible.” It’s not that Obama should be held accountable for the statements and actions of all his supporters but he can control his associations (e.g. with his pastor). And the question remains, what is it about Obama that endears him to so many unsavory characters?

The jury is still out on the al-Qaeda/ bin Laden endorsement…I will post an update if I hear anything.

JAKE ADDS: But, thinking from a game-theoretic perspective, Hamas surely realizes that its “endorsement” will detract support from any candidate. Thus, Hamas would reasonably choose to endorse the candidate it most fears—the candidate it thinks would deal it the most damage.

(And of course, it makes sense that Hamas would prefer McCain to Obama: People who make musical puns like “bomb bomb bomb, bomb bomb Iran” don’t exactly endear potential jihadists to the United States.)

Now, thinking one step still further, if both Hamas and the American public are rational actors, which is questionable in both cases, Hamas would realize that we would realize the above. And we realize that Hamas would realize that we would realize it. And so on. So the effect of Hamas’s endorsement is unpredictable. The game-theoretic fact of the matter is thus that Hamas should choose at random which candidate to endorse. Therefore under the assumption that both entites are rational, Hamas’s endorsement tells us nothing about which candidate it most fears.

My hypothesis is that the American public, not knowing any game theory, is not a rational actor, but that Hamas’s strategy people, despite being terrorists, are. We can safely assume Americans won’t use my line of reasoning, but rather will just turn away from any candidate Hamas endorses. In that case my first analysis is correct: Hamas wants McCain to win, and is therefore endorsing Obama.